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Abstract
A new language for epistemic logic is introduced in which the epis-
temic operators are of the form |x : x1 . . . xn| with the intended read-
ing
“x knows of x1 . . . xn that ...”.
Analogously we can express “t knows of t1 . . . tn that ... ”, where
t, t1 . . . tn are terms. An advantage of this approach is that we can
quantify on the agents, “every y knows of x1 . . . xn that A” or “some
expert knows of t1 . . . tn that A” can easily be expressed. The seman-
tics we present for this language is a generalization of the transition
semantics, called epistemic transition semantics in which the possible
worlds are states of affairs compatible with the epistemic state of some
agent. A calculus is presented and shown to be complete with respect
to epistemic transition semantics.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge by the help of logical notions and tools has orig-
inated a mess of different approaches to knowledge depending, among other
things, on the intended applications: ordinary language, artificial intelli-
gence, game theory, comunication protocols. Various types of logics have
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been introduced starting with epistemic logics in the style of Hintikka [6],
then multi-agent logics and common knowledge logics in the style of Fagin
et al.,[4]. This last book has set the agenda for future research up to the
present days and this paper locates itself in its wake.
Typically, the first step of every approach considered consists in setting the
appropriate language in order to deal with the chosen aspect or variant of the
notion of knowledge under study. As a matter of fact most of the languages
are propositional languages obtained by adding to the boolean connectives a
finite set of modal operators. In the case of epistemic logic these operators
are indexed by agents Ki, Kj, . . .
Ki(A)
agent i knows that A
When we move to first-order level, quantification is allowed with respect to
A but not with respect to the agents, we can say that ‘i knows that someone
is P ’, but not that ‘someone knows that someone is P ’.
We will take a quite different approach by introducing epistemic opera-
tors indexed by terms analogous to the indexed modal operators for alethic
modalities. In the case of alethic modalities, see [2], 2P (x) is not a well-
formed formula since x is free in P (x) and it has to be replaced by
|x |P (x)
to be read as
‘it is necessary for x to be P (x)’.
|x | is a box-operator indexed by x. A more complex form of the box-operator
is the following one
| ix |P (x)
‘it is necessary for the individual i to have the property λx.P (x)’.
Dually,
〈 ix 〉P (x)
‘ it is possible for i to have the property λx.P (x)’. Again,
| ix jy |R(x, y)
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‘it is necessary for i and j to stand in the relation λxλy.R(x, y)’.
In the case of epistemic modalities we need to distinguish the agent of the
act of knowing from the objects of knowledge, therefore epistemic operators
will have the form
| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A
t knows of t1 . . . tn that A.
where x1 . . . xn is a list of variables without repetitions that may contain also
variables occurring in t, and A contains at most the variables x1 . . . xn.
Features of the notation just introduced:
• the epistemic operator binds the variables x1, . . . , xn occurring in A
• the variables occurring in t, t1, . . . , tn are the free variables of
|t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A.
• if A is a sentence | t : |A is well formed, ‘t knows that A’
• by convention |x : x1 . . . xn |A stands for |x : x1x1 . . . xnxn |A
• de re / de dicto distinction
de re | t : ix |Px ‘t knows of i that (s)he is P’
de dicto | t : |Pi ‘t knows that Pi’
• substitution is indicated inside the epistemic operator, it is not carried
out in A
(|x : x1 . . . xn |A)[t/x, t1/x1 . . . tn/xn] : = | t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A
(| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A) [s/y] := | t[s/y]x : t1[s/y]x1 . . . tn[s/y]xn |A
• substitution does not commute with epistemic operators.
| t : ix |Px 6↔ | t : |Pi
We need to add specific axioms if we want substitution to commute
with epistemic-operators.
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Before giving the formal definition of a first-order epistemic language with
indexed knowledge operators, let us look at some examples.
All Mary’s friends know that she likes Paul
∀x(friend(x,Mary)→ |x : Maryy | likes(y, Paul))
and this sentence is not equivalent to
∀x(friend(x,Mary)→ |x : | likes(Mary, Paul))
In the latter sentence Mary is in a de dicto position, in the former sentence
in a de re position.
Someone knows that all Peter’s friends know that he likes Mary
∃x|x : Petery |∀z(friend(z, y)→ |z : y |likes(y,Mary))
Someone knows who is late
∃x∃y|x : y |late(y)
Someone knows who Dr Smith is
∃x∃y|x : y |(y = Dr Smith)
Peter knows that he is Peter
|Peter : Peterx |(x = Peter)
All experts known by Peter know that smoking is dangerous
∀x(expert(x) ∧ ∃y|Peter : x, y|(x = y)→ |x : |dangerous(smoking))
2 Language
Definition 2.1
• Terms are either variables or individual constants and the set of free
variables occurring in a term t, fv(t), is either {t} if t is a variable or
the empty set, otherwise.
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• The logical symbols are ⊥,→,∀, | t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |, n ≥ 0, where x1, . . . , xn
is a list of pairwise distinct variables and t, t1, . . . , tn are terms. When
n = 0 we write |t : |.
Definition 2.2 of well formed formula and of free variable in a wff.
wff free variables
⊥ fv(⊥) = ∅
P nt1, . . . , tn fv(P
nt1, . . . , tn) = fv(t1) ∪ . . . ∪ fv(tn)
A→ B fv(A→ B) = fv(A) ∪ fv(B)
| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A where fv(A) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}
fv(| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn|A) = fv(t) ∪ fv(t1) ∪ . . . ∪
fv(tn)
∀xA fv(∀xA) = fv(A)− {x}
¬A, A ∨ B, A ∧ B, A ↔ B, ∃xA, 〈 t : t1x1 . . . tnxn 〉A are defined as usual
and |x : x1 . . . xn|A and 〈x : x1 . . . xn〉A stand for |x : x1x1 . . . xnxn |A and
〈x : x1x1 . . . xnxn 〉A, respectively.
Definition 2.3 of simultaneous substitution. Given a wff A containing the
free variables x1, . . . , xk, we define the wff A[s1/x1 . . . sk/xk] where the term
si is substituted for xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let [s/x] =df [s1/x1 . . . sk/xk].
• ⊥ [s/x] =⊥
• (P nt1, . . . , tn)[s/x] = P n(t1[s/x], . . . , tn[s/x]), where
– ti[s/x] = si if ti ∈ {x1, . . . , xk}
– ti[s/x] = ti if ti 6∈ {x1, . . . , xk}
• (A→ B)[s/x] = (A[s/x]→ B[s/x])
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• (∀yA)[s/x] =
=

∀y(A[s/x]) if y /∈ ({x1, . . . , xk} ∪ {s1, . . . , sk})
∀z((A[z/y])[s/x] where z doesn’t occur in ∀yAand z /∈ {s1, . . . , sk}
if y 6∈ {x1, . . . , xk} and y ∈ {s1, . . . , sk}
∀yA if y ∈ {x1, . . . , xk}
• (| t : t1y1 . . . tnyn |A)[s/x] = | t[s/x] : t1[s/x]y1 . . . tn[s/x]yn |A
3 Semantics
The main idea behind the epistemic transition semantics is that
|t : sx|P (x)
is true at a world w if t is an individual existing at w, s is an individual
existing at w and in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of t the
t-counterparts of s (the counterparts of s according to t) in those worlds
satisfy P (x).
|t : |P (s)
is true at a world w if t is an individual existing at w and in all worlds
compatible with the epistemic state of t whoever is s in those worlds satisfies
P (x).
An epistemic transition model (in brief, an epistemic model) is a fam-
ily of classical models endowed with (1) a relation of compatibility between
individuals and models and (2) a counterpart relation between individuals
of different models or of the same model. We will call worlds the classical
models, following the terminology of possible world semantics. In details, let
W be a not empty set of worlds, so each w ∈ W is a pair 〈Dw, Iw〉 where
Dw is a not-empty set, the domain of w and Iw is an interpretation function
such that:
• for every relation P n, Iw(P n) ⊆ (Dw)n
• Iw(=) = {〈a, a〉 : a ∈ Dw}
• for every individual constant i, Iw(i) ∈ Dw
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We assume that Dw ∩ Dv = ∅ when w 6= v. By ≺ we denote a relation
between elements of E = ⋃{Dw}w∈W and elements of W :
≺ ⊆ (E ×W).
If a ≺ v holds, then we say that the world v is epistemically compatible
with the individual a or that v is compatible with the epistemic state of a.
By
a we denote the counterpart relation parametrized by the individual a:
a ⊆
⋃
{Dw ×Dv : a ∈ Dw ∧ a ≺ v}
If a, b ∈ Dw, c ∈ Dv and b
a c holds, then we say that c is a counterpart
of b according to a (in a world epistemically compatible with a).
Definition 3.1 An epistemic transition model M = 〈W,≺,, D, I〉 is a
quintuple where W and ≺ are defined as above,  = ⋃{ a}a∈E , D is a
function that associates to any w ∈ W its domain Dw and I is a function
that associates to any w ∈ W its interpretation function Iw.
Definition 3.2 For every w ∈ W , a w-assignment is a function σ : V AR→
Dw. If σ is a w-assignment, σ
xBd denotes the w-assignment which behaves
exactly like σ except that it maps x to d ∈ Dw.
Given a w-assignment σ the interpretation of t in w under σ, Iσw(t), is defined
in the standard way:
• Iσw(x) = σ(x)
• Iσw(i) = Iw(i)
Notational convention. When no ambiguity can arise, we write σ(t) in-
stead of Iσw(t).
Definition 3.3 of satisfaction. We define when a wff A is satisfied at w
by a w-assignment σ in an epistemic model M, σ |=Mw A.
σ 6|=Mw ⊥
σ |=Mw P k(t1 . . . tk) iff σ(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ Iw(P k)
σ |=Mw B → G iff σ 6|=Mw B or σ |=Mw G
σ |=Mw ∀xG iff for all d ∈ Dw, σxBd |=Mw G
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σ |=Mw | t : t1y1 . . . tnyn |G iff for all v such that σ(t) ≺ v, and
all v-assignments τ such that σ(t1)
σ(t)

τ(y1), . . . , σ(tn)
σ(t)
 τ(yn), then τ |=Mv G
Definition 3.4 .
• A wff A is true at w in M, |=Mw A, iff for every w-assignment σ,
σ |=Mw A.
• A wff A is true in M, |=M A, iff for every w, |=Mw A.
• A wff A is valid on a class C of epistemic transition models iff A is
true in each of them.
Lemma 3.5 on substitution and satisfaction for terms and formulas. Let σ
be a w-assignment.
σ(t[s/x]) = σxBσ(s)(t)
σ |=w A[s/x] iff σxBσ(s) |=w A
Proof By induction on A.
• A = P n(t1, . . . , tn)
σxBσ(s) |=w P n(t1, . . . , tn) iff 〈σxBσ(s)(t1), . . . , σxBσ(s)(tn)〉 ∈ Iw(P n) iff
〈σ(t1[s/x]), . . . , σ(tn[s/x])〉 ∈ Iw(P n) iff σ |=w P n(t1[s/x], . . . , tn[s/x])
iff σ |=w P n(t1, . . . , tn)[s/x].
• A = ∀yB and y 6= s and y 6= x
σxBσ(s) |=w ∀yB iff for all d ∈ Dw, σxBσ(s),yBd |=w B iff for all d ∈ Dw,
σyBd,xBσ(s) |=w B iff by induction hypothesis for all d ∈ Dw, σyBd |=w
B[s/x] iff σ |=w ∀y(B[s/x]) iff by def. of substitution σ |=w (∀yB)[s/x].
The cases in which either y = s or y = x are similar.
• A = | t1y1 . . . tnyn |B
σxBσ(s) |=w | t : t1y1 . . . tnyn |B iff
τ |=v B for all v-assignment τ such that σxBσ(s)(ti)
σxBσ(s)(t)
 τ(yi),
1 ≤ i ≤ n, iff
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τ |=v B for all v-assignment τ such that σ(ti[s/x])
σ(t[s/x])
 τ(yi), 1 ≤
i ≤ n, iff
σ |=w | t[s/x], t1[s/x]y1 . . . tn[s/x]yn |B iff
σ |=w (| t, t1y1 . . . tnyn |B)[s/x].
3.1 Validity
The epistemic semantics we have seen so far is a generalization of the transi-
tion semantics presented in Corsi [2] and at the same time a particular case
of a more general semantics called cone transition semantics due to Gabriele
Tassi [?] and [3]. Most of the results proved in [2] hold for the epistemic
case. The main difference with respect to transition semantics is that the
accessibility relation among worlds is parametrized by individuals. We do
not say anymore that a world w is related to or accessible to another world
v, but rather that v is compatible with the epistemic state of an individual
a living in w. Moreover, as we have seen, also the counterpart relation is
parametrized by individuals, so we speak of the a-counterpart of b, meaning
the counterpart of b according to a, parametrized by a.
Notice first that no condition has been put in order to establish some
connections between the counterparts in a world v of an individual b living
in w and the interpretation of b in v. This fact has the consequence that the
following two types of knowledge are quite different:
| i : tx1 sx2 |(x1 = x2) i knows of t and s that they are equal
| i : |(t = s) i knows that t is equal to s
The first sentence is true at a world w iff in all worlds v compatible
with the epistemic state of i, all the i-counterparts in v of t and s (the
interpretation of t and s in w) are identical. The second sentence is true at
w iff in all worlds v compatible with the epistemic state of i the interpretation
of t and s in v are identical.
For particular individual constants i, t and s we can assume that the
i-counterparts in a world v of t in w include the interpretation of t in v. A
consequence is that the wff
| i : tx1 sx2 |(x1 = x2)→ | i : |(t = s)
is valid. When this is the case we say that the terms t and s are i-rigid,
i.e. are rigid terms from the point of view of i. For some student i it might
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well be that if (s)he knows of Walter Scott and Ivanhoe that the first is the
author of the second, than (s)he knows also the fact that Walter Scott is the
author of Ivanhoe, because in the worlds (s)he can envisage the counterparts
of both Walter Scott and Ivanhoe include the interpretations of both names
in those worlds.
We can impose even stronger constrains on the counterpart relation, e.g.
that the i-counterpart in a world v of the interpretations in w of t and s
coincide with the interpretations of t and s, respectively, in v. For example
if t and s are numbers, say 9 and 7, we may want that for any individual i,
the i-counterpart in a world v of the interpretations of 9 and 7 in w coincide
with the interpretation of 9 and 7 in v, respectively. When this is the case
the terms 9 and 7 are said to be i-stable and the following formula is valid
| i : 9x1 7x2 |A(x1, x2)↔ | i : |A(9, 7)
This equivalence doesn’t hold in general, not even for variables, instead
the following implication, say from de re to de dicto, holds for variables:
RGve | t : y1x1 . . . ynxn |A→ |y : v1 . . . vk|(A[y1/x1 . . . yn/xn])
where v1 . . . vk are the variables y1 . . . yn without repetitions.
Therefore we say that variables are rigid designators. In the case of aletic
modalities it is often assumed that all terms, not just variables, are rigid
designators and so the following formula is taken as an axiom
RG |t1x1 . . . tnxn |A→ |v1 . . . vk|(A[t1/x1 . . . tn/xn])
where v1 . . . vk are the variables occurring in t1, . . . tn.
The rigidity axiom is untenable, in general, in the epistemic case:
RGe |t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A→ |v1 . . . vk|y : (A[t1/x1 . . . tn/xn])
Let us stress that the converse of RGve is not valid, just consider the following
instance:
|i : y|(y = y)→ | i : yx1yx2 |(x1 = x2)
It is certainly true that in all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of
i, each individual is identical with itself, but at the same time if y has two
different i-counterparts in a world v, then (x1 = x2) may be falsified in v.
4 The epistemic logic Q.Ke
Now we present a calculus for epistemic logic which makes no assumptions
either on the compatibility relation or on the counterpart relation. Q.Ke
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intends to be the core system of any quantified logic either of belief or of
knowledge or of obligation. We can think of weaker systems than Q.Ke in
the style of Gabriele Tassi [7], where the greater generality of Tassi’s systems
resides in the fact that the epistemic operators are indexed by lists of terms
and not by pairs composed of a term and a set of terms, as we do, see axiom
PRM .
Here are the axioms and inference rules of Q.Ke.
Tautologies
PRMe |x : x1 . . . xn|A↔ |x : xi1 . . . xin|A
for every permutation xi1 . . . xin of x1 . . . xn
Ke |x : x1 . . . xn|(A→ B)→ (|x : x1 . . . xn|A→ |x : x1 . . . xn|B)
UI ∀xA(x)→ A
LNGTe |x : x1 . . . xn|A→ |x : x1 . . . xn, xn+1 |A
RGve | y : y1x1 . . . ynxn |A→ |y : v1 . . . vk|(A[y1/x1 . . . yn/xn])
where v1 . . . vk are the variables y1 . . . yn without ripeti-
tions.
ID x = x
LBZ t = s→ (A[t/x]→ A[s/x])
A A→ B
(MP )
B
A
(Ne)|x : x1 . . . xn|A
provided {x1, . . . , xn} ⊇ fv(A).
A→ B
(UG)
A→ ∀xB
provided x /∈ fv(A)
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A
(SFV )
A[s/x]
The notions of proof and theorem are defined in the usual way.
5 Completeness of Q.Ke
The completeness proof we present follows the same strategy of the proof
given in Corsi [2] and in Ghilardi [1]. Given a language with indexed op-
erators L, we define a classical first-order language L which contains the
same predicate and constant symbols of L, and moreover for each formula
| t : x1 . . . xn |A of L a new predicate symbol P n+1| :x1...xn |A. Then we translate
each formula of L into a formula of L according to the following definition:
Definition 5.1
⊥ = ⊥
P n(t1, . . . , tn) = P
n(t1, . . . , tn)
s = t = s = t
(A→ B) = A→ B
∀xiA = ∀xiA
| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |A = P n+1| :x1...xn |A(t, t1, . . . , tn)
Lemma 5.2 A[s/x] = A[s/x], for all formulas A ∈ L.
Proof. By induction on A.
• P (t1, . . . , tn)[s/x] = P (t1[s/x], . . . , tn[s/x]) = P (t1[s/x], . . . , tn[s/x]) =
P (t1, . . . , tn)[s/x] = P (t1, . . . , tn)[s/x]
• Let y 6= x and y 6= s. (∀yB)[s/x] = ∀y(B[s/x]) = ∀y(B[s/x]) =
∀y(B[s/x]) = (∀yB)[s/x]) = ∀yB[s/x]
The other cases relative to quantified formulas are similar.
• (| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |B)[s/x] = (| t[s/x] : t1[s/x]x1 . . . tn[s/x]xn |B) =
P n+1| :x1...xn |B(t[s/x], t1[s/x], . . . , tn[s/x]) =
(P n+1| :x1...xn |B(t, t1, . . . , tn))[s/x] = (| t : t1x1 . . . tnxn |B)[s/x]
We now define a classical theory Q.Ke whose specific axioms are
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{A : Q.Ke ` A}
Lemma 5.3 X `Q.Ke A iff X `Q.Ke A.
Proof. We show that `Q.Ke B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn → A iff `Q.Ke B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn → A,
where B1, . . . , Bn ∈ X.
⇒ holds by definition of Q.Ke
⇐ holds because the specific axioms of Q.Ke are the translations of the
theorems of Q.Ke and the inference rules of Q.Ke are also inference rules of
Q.Ke.
Let S be a family of classical models for Q.Ke. Each model w is a
pair 〈Dw, Iw〉 where Dw is a not-empty set, the domain of w and Iw is an
interpretation function. With 〈σ,w〉 c|=B we denote that the formula B is
satisfied by the assignment σ in the model w according to the standard
classical definition and with w
c|=B that B is (classically) true in the model
w.
Lemma 5.4 Let σ be a w-assignment and A a wff of L.
〈σ,w〉 c|=A[s/x] iff 〈σxBσ(s), w〉 c|=A
Proof By induction on A. We examine the case when A is |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C.
Then 〈σ,w〉 c|= |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C[s/x] iff by lemma 5.2
〈σ,w〉 c|= |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C[s/x] iff
〈σ,w〉 c|=(P n+1|:y1...yn|C(t, t1, . . . , tn))[s/x] iff by lemma 3.5
〈σxBσ(s), w〉 c|=P n+1|:y1...yn|C(t, t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈σxBσ(s), w〉 c|= |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C
Definition 5.5 Let w, v be Q.Ke-models. For any a ∈ Dw we say that
a ≺ v iff v |=c {A : 〈σx.a, w〉 c|= |x : |A}
In words, v is compatible with the epistemic state of a iff every sentence
known by a is true in v.
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Definition 5.6 Let w, v be Q.Ke-models. For any a ∈ Dw, a relation
a
⊆ Dw × Dv is said to be a transition relation admissible for a iff for every
k ≥ 0, every w-assignment σ and every v-assignment τ ,
〈σ(xi), τ(xi) 〉 ∈
a for i = 1, . . . , k1
only if
〈σx.a, w〉 c|= |x : x1...xk|A ⇒ 〈τ, v〉 c|=A
holds for every formula A containing (at most) the variables x1, ..., xk.
In words, if τ(xi) is a counterpart of σ(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, according to a, then if
a knows of σ(x1) . . . σ(xk) that A, then A is satisfied in v by τ(x1) . . . τ(xk).
Lemma 5.7 Let w be a Q.Ke-model and 〈σ, w〉 6 c|= |x : x1...xm|A for some
formula |x : x1...xm|A and w-assignment σ. Then there is a Q.Ke-model v
and a v-assignment τ such that:
1. 〈τ, v〉 6 c|=A;
2. σ(x) ≺ v;
3. the set
σ(x)
 = {〈σ(x1), τ(x1)〉, 〈σ(x2), τ(x2)〉, . . . , 〈σ(xm), τ(xm)〉} is a
transition relation admissible for σ(x).
Proof
• Let Γ be the following set of (classical) formulae:
Γ = {¬A}∪{B : 〈σ, w〉 c|= |x : xj1 ...xjh|B,where {xj1 ...xjh} ⊆ {x1, ..., xm} }.
First we show that Γ is Q.Ke-consistent. Assume by reductio that it is
not, then:
(1) `Q.Ke B1 ∧ ... ∧Br → A
(2) `Q.Ke B1 ∧ ... ∧Br → A (5.3)
(3) `Q.Ke |x : x1...xm|B1 ∧ ... ∧ |x : x1...xm|Br → |x : x1...xm|A (Ne)
(4) `Q.Ke |x : xj1 ...xjh1 |B1 ∧ ... ∧ |x : xj1 ...xjhr |Br → |x : x1...xm|A (LNGTe)
(5) `Q.Ke |x : xj1 ...xjh1 |B1 ∧ ... ∧ |x : xj1 ...xjhr |Br → |x : x1...xm|A (5.3)
Therefore, we would have that 〈σ, w〉 c|= |x : x1...xm|A contrary to the
fact that 〈σ, w〉 6 c|= |x : x1...xm|A.
Since Γ is Q.Ke-consistent, by classical model theory there is a model
v and a v-assignment τ such that 〈τ, v〉 c|= Γ, therefore 〈τ, v〉 6 c|=A.
1We also write σ(xi)
a τ(xi) for i = 1, . . . , k
14
• By the way Γ is defined, Γ contains all the formulae B without free
variables such that 〈σ,w〉 c|= |x : |B , therefore σ(x) ≺ v.
• We have to show that the set σ(x) is a counterpart relation admissible for
σ(x), i.e. for any k > 0, any formula C(y1, . . . , yk), any w-assignment
pi and any v-assignment µ, if
(i) pi(y) = σ(x) (ii) 〈pi, w〉 c|= |y : y1...yk|C
(iii) pi(yi)
σ(x)
 µ(yi) i = 1 . . . k
then
〈µ, v〉 c|=C(y1, . . . , yk)
By the definition of
σ(x)
 , if pi(yi)
σ(x)
 µ(yi) , i = 1 . . . k, then for some
xji ∈ {x1, ..., xm},
(a) pi(yi) = σ(xji)
and
(b) µ(yi) = τ(xji)
It follows from (ii) that:
〈piy1.σ(xj1 )...yk.σ(xjk ), w〉 c|= |y : y1...yk|C
Given that y1, ..., yk are all the free variables in C and that pi(y) = σ(x),
this is equivalent to:
〈σy.σ(x), y1.σ(xj1 )...yk.σ(xjk ), w〉 c|= |y : y1...yk|C
By lemma 3.5 we get that:
〈σ, w〉 c|= |y[x/y] : xj1y1 ...xjkyk |C
Then by MP with the (translation of the) axiom RGv it obtains that:
〈σ, v〉 c|= |x : v1...vh|(C[xj1/y1...xjk/yk])
Given that {v1, . . . , vh} ⊆ {xj1 , ..., xjk} ⊆ {x1, ..., xm}, it follows that
C[xj1/y1...xjk/yk] ∈ Γ. Therefore
〈τ, v〉 c|=C[xj1/y1...xjk/yk]
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By lemma 3.5 we get that:
〈τ y1.τ(xj1 )...yk.τ(xjk ), v〉 c|=C(y1, . . . , yk)
But all the free variables of C are among y1, ..., yk, therefore this is
equivalent to:
〈µy1.τ(xj1 )...yk.τ(xjk ), v〉 c|=C(y1, . . . , yk)
By the definition of
σ(x)
 , if pi(yi)
σ(x)
 µ(yi) for all i = 1 . . . k, then, for
all i = 1 . . . k there is a xji ∈ {xi, ..., xm} such that τ(xji) = µ(yi).
Therefore we have:
〈µy1.µ(y1)...yk.µ(yk), v〉 c|=C(y1, . . . , yk)
i.e.
〈µ, v〉 c|=C(y1, . . . , yk)
The set
σ(x)
 as defined in lemma 5.7 gives the minimal counterpart relation
that links the model w to the model v in dependence of the formula A, the
w-assignment σ and the individual σ(x). Between Dw and Dv no other
counterpart relation is taken into account even if extensions of
σ(x)
 may be
admissible. If σ(x) = a for some a ∈ Dw, we call the set
a the canonical
counterpart relation relative to a, w and v, in brief CNTP(a,w,v). Notice
that if CNTP (a, w, v) 6= ∅, then a ≺ w.
Definition 5.8 Let S be a set of Q.Ke-models. We say that:
• w ∈ S is realized in S iff for each w-assignment σ and each formula
|x : x1...xm|A of L, if 〈σ, w〉 6 c|= |x : x1...xm|A, then there is a Q.Ke-
model v ∈ S and a v-assignment τ such that:
– σ(x) ≺ v;
– σ(xi)
σ(x)
 τ(xi), for every xi ∈ {x1, ..., xm};
– 〈τ, v〉 6 c|=A.
• S is fully realized iff every member of S is realized in S and for any
z, w ∈ S, if z 6= w then Dz ∩Dw = ∅.
Lemma 5.9 For every Q.Ke-model w there is a set Sw of Q.Ke-models such
that:
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• w ∈ Sw;
• Sw is fully realized.
proof We define a chain S0,S1 . . . ,Sn, . . . of sets of classical models such
that S0 = {w} and Sn+1 is obtained fron Sn by adding to it new Q.Ke-models
so as to realize the models already present in Sn. This step is performed
according to lemma 5.7 taking care to choose models whose domains do not
overlap the domains of the models already present in Sn. Let Sw be the
union of the chain.
The fully realized set Sw whose elements are constructed according to
lemma 5.7 is said to be canonical. In a canonical (fully realized) set the
relation CNTP (a, w, v) is uniquely determined given w and v, in fact if
CNTP (a, w, v) = CNTP (b, w, v) then a = b, so as far as canonical sets are
concerned, we will talk of the relation CNTP (w, v).
Given a canonical set Sw, the modelMSw = 〈Sw, D, ≺, , I〉 is said to
be a canonical epistemic model if
• D is a function such that for every z = 〈Dz, Iz〉 ∈ Sw, D(z) = Dz
• ≺= {〈a, v〉 : a ∈ Dw, v |=c {A : 〈σx.a, w〉 c|= |x : |A, for all A ∈ L}, for
some w, v ∈ Sw, and w-assignment σ}
• = ⋃{CNTP (w, v)}w,v∈Sw
• I is a function such that for every z = 〈Dz, Iz〉 ∈ Sw, I(z) = Iz
Lemma 5.10 Given a canonical epistemic model MSw = 〈Sw, D, ≺,
, I〉, for every formula B of L and every z-assignment σ,
σ |=MSwz B iff 〈σ, z〉
c|=B
for all z ∈ Sw.
proof By induction on B. We examine just two cases.
• If B is atomic, the lemma holds thanks to the definition of the inter-
pretation function I of MSw .
• B = |t : t1y1 . . . tnyn|C, where fv(B) = {y, y1, . . . , yn}.
If σ 6|=Mz |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C, then by lemma 3.5
σyBσ(t),y1Bσ(t1),... ynBσ(tn) 6|=MSwz |y : y1 . . . yn|C
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where y is a variable different from y1 . . . yn.
To simplify the notation, let pi = σyBσ(t),y1Bσ(t1),... ynBσ(tn), then
pi 6|=MSwz |y : y1 . . . yn|C
By definition 3.3 of satisfaction there is a v such that pi(y) ≺ v, a v-assignment
τ such that τ 6|=MSwv C, and moreover pi(yi)
pi(y)
 τ(yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By
induction hypothesis 〈τ, v〉 6 c|=C. Since pi(yi)
pi(y)
 τ(yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
〈pi, z〉 6 c|= |y : y1 . . . yn|C
thanks to the definition 5.6. Consequently 〈σ, z〉 6 c|= |t : t1y1 . . . tnyn|C by lemma
3.5 and the definition of pi.
Conversely, if 〈σ, z〉 6 c|= |t : t1y1 . . . . . . tnyn|C, then by definition 2.3,
〈σ, z〉 6 c|= |y : y1 . . . . . . yn|C[t/y, t1/y1 . . . tn/yn]
where y is a variable different from y1 . . . yn, hence by lemma 5.4
〈σyBσ(t),y1Bσ(t1)......ynBσ(tn), z〉 6 c|= |y : y1 . . . yn|C
To simplify the notation, let pi = σyBσ(t),y1Bσ(t1),... ynBσ(tn), then
〈pi, z〉 6 c|= |y : y1 . . . yn|C
Since Sw is fully realized, there is a classical model v such that pi(y) ≺ v and
there is a v-assignment τ such that 〈τ, v〉 c|={B : 〈pi, z〉 c|= |y : y1 . . . yn|B} ∪
{¬C} and moreover pi(yi)
pi(y)
 τ(yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence 〈τ, v〉 |=v ¬C,
〈τ, v〉 6|=v C, therefore by induction hypothesis τ 6|=MS
w
v C. Since pi(yi)
pi(y)

τ(yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pi 6|=MS
w
z |y : y1 . . . yn|C by definition 5.6. Consequently
σ 6|=MSwz |t : t1y1 . . . tnyn|C.
Theorem 5.11 (Completeness) If a wff A ∈ L is not a theorem of Q.Ke,
then it is not valid on the class of transition epistemic models.
6 Correspondence
• What is known is true (Te) |x : x1 . . . xn |A→ A
It corresponds to the following conditions:
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– a ∈ Dw only if a ≺ w
– for all a, b ∈ Dw, b
a b
Let a = σ(y) for some y and σ. If axiom Te holds, then w
c|={A :
〈σ,w〉 c|= |y : |A}, therefore a ≺ w. Moreover, since 〈σ,w〉 c|= |t : x1 . . . xn|A
only if 〈σ,w〉 c|=A, then σ(xi)
σ(t)
 σ(xi)
• Positive introspection (4e) |x : x1 . . . xn |A→ |x : x, x1 . . . xn | |x :
x1 . . . xn |A
It corresponds to the following conditions:
– given a ∈ Dw and b ∈ Dv, if a
a b and b ≺ z, then a ≺ z
– for all a, b ∈ Dw, c, d ∈ Dv, e ∈ Dz, if a
a d and b a c and
c
d e, then a a e
• Negative introspection (5e) ¬|x : x1 . . . xn |A→ |x : x, x1 . . . xn | ¬ | x :
x1 . . . xn |A
It corresponds to the following conditions:
– given a ∈ Dw and b ∈ Dz, if a ≺ v, a ≺ z and a
a b, then b ≺ v
– for all a, d ∈ Dw, c, b ∈ Dv, e ∈ Dz, if d
a c and d a e and
a
a b then c b e
As shown in [2], some conditions of the counterpart relation correspond
to modal formulas.
• The Barcan formula : ∀y|x : y, x1, . . . , xn|A→ |x : x1, . . . , xn|∀yA
corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being sur-
jective.
If Peter knows of all his friends that they are trustworthy, then Peter
knows that all his friends are trustworthy.
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∀y(best friend(y, Peter)→ |Peter : y|trustworthy(y))→ |Peter :
|∀y(best friend(y, Peter)→ trustworthy(y))
This sentence can be falsified if in worlds compatible with the epistemic
state of Peter now, Peter has friends apart from the Peter-counterparts
of his friends now.
• The Ghilardi formula : ∃y|x : y, x1, . . . , xn|A→ |x : x1, . . . , xn|∃yA
corresponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being every-
where defined.
If Peter knows of his best friend that he is trustworthy, then Peter
knows that someone is trustworthy.
∃y(best friend(y, Peter)∧|Peter : y |trusthworthy(y))→ |Peter :
|∃y trustworthy(y)
This sentence can be falsified if in worlds compatible with the epistemic
state of Peter now, there are no Peter-counterparts of Peter’s best friend
now.
• The knowledge of identity : x = y → |z : x, y|(x = y) corre-
sponds to the property of the counterpart relation of being functional.
If Peter’s best friend is Brian’s father, then Peter knows of his best
friend that he is Brian’s father.
P ′bf = B′f → |Peter : P ′bfx , B′fy |(x = y)
This sentence can be falsified if in worlds compatible with the epistemic
state of Peter now, Peter-counterparts of Peter’s best friend now are
different from Peter-counterparts of Brian’s father.
• The knowledge of diversity : x 6= y → |z : x, y|(x 6= y) corre-
sponds to the property of the counterpart relation of not being conver-
gent.
If Peter’s best friend is not Brian’s father, then Peter knows of his best
friend that he is not Brian’s father.
P ′bf 6= B′f → |p : P ′bfx , B′fy |(x 6= y)
This sentence can be falsified since Peter-counterparts of Peter’s best
friend now can be the same as Peter-counterparts of Brian’s father in
all worlds compatible with the epistemic state of Peter now.
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